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Response to a Changing 
Hemispheric Order
Philip Brenner and Eric Hershberg
I. Introduction
U.S. relations with Latin America historically have been characterized 
by stark degrees of asymmetry. Since the time of the Monroe Doctrine 
the United States has tended to treat Latin America as its “backyard,” 
even when U.S. leaders proclaimed the countries as “good neighbors.” 
Worse, as historian Greg Grandin argues, since 1945 Washington 
may at times have viewed Latin America as a laboratory in which to 
experiment with tactics later used to subordinate other regions of 
the world.1 Throughout much of the second half of the twentieth 
century —Jimmy Carter’s presidency was a partial exception— 
economic, ideological and security objectives of the U.S. reinforced 
one another in such a way as to generate a landscape emblematic 
of dramatic North-South power differentials. When Latin American 
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 governments resisted this state of affairs —as did Cuba from 1959 
onward, Chile and Jamaica during the 1970s, and Nicaragua and 
Grenada during the 1980s— the backlash from Washington was sharp 
and unequivocal. Challengers to U.S. hegemony were expected, to 
paraphrase the rap musician Gil Scott Heron’s characterization of the 
Reagan administration’s stance, to “get off this planet by sundown.” 
It was in this spirit that Secretary of State Christian A. Herter made 
clear in a November 1959 memo that Cuba’s primary crime was its 
challenge to U.S. hegemony. He argued that the United States did 
not need to overthrow Cuba’s revolutionary regime because it was 
communist (which is was not at the time) or because of its ties to 
the Soviet Union (it did not yet have diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Union). Rather, confrontation was justified because Cuba 
“has veered towards a ‘neutralist’ anti-American foreign policy...
which, if emulated by other Latin American countries, would have 
serious adverse effects on Free WorId support of our leadership....”.2 
Similar perspectives guided U.S. policymakes for the remainder of 
the Cold War, as was evident in Washington’s support for friendly 
military regimes in South America from the 1950s to 1980s and U.S. 
interventions in the Central American conflicts of the 1980s.
The world has changed in countless ways since that not so long ago 
period. Few Latin Americans, including Cubans, harbor aspirations 
any longer for far-reaching socialist transformation, and there is near 
unanimity as to the desirability of market-oriented development 
and some form of electoral democracy. Meanwhile, multi-polarity 
has replaced the unipolar landscape that prevailed in the Americas 
throughout the Cold War and 1990s. Having emerged from three 
decades of stagnation, Brazil has become a major regional power, 
the world’s sixth largest economy and a visible player in world affairs 
that even under a succession of left-leaning governments seeks by 
all accounts to consolidate a relationship of cooperation with the 
United States that is consistent with the transformed landscape of 
the twenty-first century. Even in Havana, Caracas, Quito, La Paz, and 
Managua —the capital cities of the ALBA alliance in which a reflexive 
anti-Americanism remains vibrant— rhetoric has not vitiated 
pragmatic efforts to maintain or develop trade with the United 
States and engage the colossus while continuing to diversify trade, 
investment and diplomatic ties to other parts of the world. At the 
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same time, in Washington, in an environment shaped by exhaustion 
from taxing wars in the Middle East and South Asia, the Obama 
administration has proclaimed since its inception a commitment to 
evolving partnerships among equals in the Americas. Not since the 
early Alliance for Progress has the message articulated by the White 
House so avowedly emphasized mutual respect and reciprocity. The 
foundation was thus was in place for what by now should have been 
a set of Hemispheric affairs distinctly different from the overarching 
logic of the prior sixty-five years.
Yet important continuities have endured amid the many changes, 
and some of these resist simple explanations. This article analyzes 
one of those continuities: the tendency of the United States to regard 
the countries located to its South as subordinates, a pattern that has 
endured despite President Obama’s proclaimed intentions to the 
contrary. The tendency is most evident in the U.S. expectation that 
a country should follow the U.S. lead without dissent, even when its 
interests are neglected, and should be treated as a pariah and even an 
enemy if it refuses to follow. The article grapples with this apparent 
paradox by focusing on the domestic forces that drive U.S. attitudes 
and policies with regard to Latin America.3 We argue that despite 
genuine desires in some quarters to hit the “re-set” button on policy 
positions rooted in an era of Hemispheric asymmetry, important 
forces in American politics and society have shaped the policy-making 
processes in ways that foster inertia with regard to U.S. relations with 
Latin America. The resulting approach to regional affairs, which we 
anticipate will extend through the remainder of the second Obama 
administration, has led to Latin American disappointment and anger 
made all the more acute because of the guarded optimism initially 
expressed by many of the region’s leaders initially about prospects for 
respectful and productive U.S.-Latin American engagement under 
Obama. 
As tensions have surfaced openly, and as the countries in the 
Hemisphere have attempted to develop new institutions for 
cooperation apart from the United States, a frustrated Washington 
seems to be opting for a new regional vision, as we analyze in the 
ultimate section of this paper. Driven by a security agenda oriented 
toward Asia and the Pacific, the United States seems intent on reviving 
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the late twentieth century neo-liberal project, which was stymied by 
South American resistance, by building on existing, trade-driven 
bilateral arrangements with Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile to 
concentrate its hemispheric agenda on only a handful of countries.4 
As we argue in the conclusion, such a policy is likely to perpetuate a 
U.S. policy out of sync with the reality it purports to address.
II. Realism in Action
President Obama’s initial signals regarding U.S.- Latin American 
relations were in effect reprises of a cooperative vision that had emerged 
in the mid-1970s but was discarded amidst the upheavals in Nicaragua 
and El Salvador at the end of the decade. The Clinton administration’s 
Latin American policies, developed during the moment of greatest 
U.S. regional influence since World War II —with the left in disarray 
and the Washington Consensus framing economic decisions —did 
not depart from a realist paradigm. Nor did the George W. Bush 
administration’s policies, which portrayed the rise of the Chavez-led 
ALBA bloc as an unacceptable challenge to U.S. interests in the region 
and potentially a threat to national security. Obama’s electoral triumph 
in 2008, however, created great expectations for change.
Reinforcing the climate of optimism, Obama’s campaign message 
of “Change you can believe in” was echoed in his first presentation 
at the Summit of the Americas, setting the stage for what seemed 
might be a new era in U.S.-Latin American relations:
“I know that promises of partnership have gone unfulfilled in the 
past and that trust has to be earned over time. While the United 
States has done much to promote peace and prosperity in the 
hemisphere, we have at times been disengaged, and at times we 
sought to dictate our terms. But I pledge to you that we seek an 
equal partnership. (Applause.)…. So I’m here to launch a new 
chapter of engagement that will be sustained throughout my 
administration (Applause)”.5
As the applause reported in the transcript from that session suggests, 
the new discourse was greeted warmly by Latin American and 
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Caribbean leaders, both for its acknowledgement of past injustices 
and its vow to jointly forge a cooperative agenda for the hemisphere. 
In many Latin American countries, as elsewhere in the world, 
Obama’s own persona as the first non-white President suggested 
unprecedented possibilities rooted in a new capacity for the United 
States to empathize with smaller powers. 
Yet the atmosphere was quite different three years later, at the 
Cartagena, Colombia, Summit of the Americas, when Latin American 
frustration with the Obama administration erupted openly. Leaders of 
even the most friendly countries were critical of Washington’s failure 
to address regional concerns about its anti-narcotics policies and the 
ongoing U.S. hostility towards Cuba. While the U.S. President would 
lament the degree to which some of his counterparts in the region 
appeared to be caught up in a Cold War mindset, it was the policies 
and discourses of the United States itself that had failed to evolve 
to reflect conditions of the twenty-first century. Washington still 
operated from a “hegemonic presumption” which political scientist 
Abraham Lowenthal described and decried in 1976.6  
Consider that in 2009 the United States felt free to ignore the 
requirements of the Inter-American Democracy Charter when the 
coup occurred in Honduras, yet it stipulates that all countries must 
follow the Charter. It has demanded that before a country can receive 
economic or military assistance it agree to waive its right to submit a 
U.S. military or civilian employee accused of a crime to the jurisdiction 
of the International Criminal Court (Article 98 Agreements).7 In 
mid-2013, the cascade of revelations about the National Security 
Agency’s spying operations throughout Latin America provided 
further evidence of a continued hegemonic mindset. Washington 
then belittled the widespread uproar in Latin America over the 
grounding of Bolivian President Evo Morales’ airplane in Europe, 
because of U.S. suspicions that former security contractor Edward 
Snowden might be aboard.
With the Obama administration now well into its second term, a 
“new normal” seems to have been established with regard to U.S.-
Latin American relations. In most respects Washington’s stance 
toward the region appears little changed from what prevailed over 
the past half century. It is an approach that still attempts to create 
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and enforce U.S. hegemonic control in three essential ways: (1) The 
U.S. economic agenda is focused largely on key components of the 
Washington Consensus; (2) the U.S. security agenda emphasizes the 
integration of Latin American militaries with those of the United 
States, and promotes militarized responses to organized crime and 
drug trafficking based on prohibitionist, anti-narcotics dogma; (3) the 
political agenda claims to be aimed at the promotion of democracy 
in accord with the Inter-American Democratic Charter, but the U.S. 
pattern of faulting only some countries for their authoritarianism 
while tolerating coups against democratically elected leaders in others 
suggests that the real U.S. political agenda is support for governments 
that accept U.S. hemispheric “leadership” without challenge.
To be sure, the implementation of a hegemonic policy with respect 
to particular countries has its subtleties. For example, the Obama 
administration has been less brazen with Brazil than in the past 
acknowledging its obvious economic power. In 2014 Washington 
reportedly remained neutral in the Salvadoran presidential election, 
and accepted the legitimacy of the close results which gave the 
presidency to Salvador Sánchez Cerén, a former guerrilla fighter with 
the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN). 
Despite such anomalies, the practice of the Obama administration 
toward Latin America is better characterized by continuity than 
change. The next section examines four factors that together would 
seem to explain this behavior.
III. Explanation of Policy Continuity under Obama
Foreign policy tends to be more difficult to change than other kinds 
of policy, because historically the issues are less salient for the public. 
Political theorists Dan Wood and Jeffrey Peake observe that presidents 
often find that issues commanding greater public attention crowd out 
foreign policy topics. Despite perceptions of wide executive authority 
to manage foreign policy, they found that “presidential attention…
is governed by the realities of scarce resources and rational efforts 
by the president to garner favorable public approval and historical 
treatment.”8 As compared to domestic issues, foreign policy issues 
are rarely connected to vocal constituencies and powerful interest 
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groups who are directly impacted by policy. Partly as a result, “policy 
paradigms” in the foreign affairs arena are particularly resistant 
to change, even amidst evidence of policy failure.9 In addition, as 
political theorist Charles Hermann notes, “foreign policy change 
must overcome normal resistance in political, administrative, and 
personality structures and processes.”10 Organizational bureaucracies 
that handle foreign policy have often been cited as barriers to change, 
requiring the significant mobilization of political will and resources 
“to overcome or circumvent the organizational structures and 
processes committed to the maintenance of existing policy.”11
Hermann identifies four different sources that lead to significant 
policy shifts: (1) the “leader,” namely the president, who “imposes 
his [or her] own vision of the basic redirection necessary in foreign 
policy”; (2) “bureaucratic advocacy,”12 whereby bureaucrats in key 
positions recognize that a current policy is not working and create 
change; (3) “domestic restructuring,” which occurs when “elites with 
power to legitimate the government either change their views or 
themselves alter in composition;” (4) “external shocks” that result 
from dramatic events and significantly reshape the context in which 
policy is formulated.13 As we review each of these factors in the case 
of Latin America policy under Obama, it becomes clear why no shift 
in the policy paradigm has occurred.
1) The President and White House: The White House insisted 
on taking the lead to shape policy towards Latin America, but the 
principal Latin American adviser until mid-2012 (Dan Restrepo) 
lacked experience. Few stakeholders who mattered respected his 
judgments. Indeed, the President turned to an old Latin America 
hand, Ambassador Jeffrey Davidow, to organize U.S. participation 
in the 2009 Summit of the Americas, a role that previously would 
have been the responsibility of the National Security Adviser for 
Latin America. Moreover, the President’s political advisers focused 
on domestic electoral calculations and these dominated decision-
making toward a region in which Obama had no prior experience 
and exhibited little personal interest. Absent a strategic vision for 
engaging with Latin America or even an inclination to prioritize 
neighbors to the South, and distracted by urgent concerns elsewhere 
at home and around the globe, the default option was to approach 
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the region in such a way as to minimize potential friction with the 
handful of influential domestic constituencies that had some degree 
of interest in Latin America policy.
The political climate surrounding Obama’s presidency epitomizes 
the ways in which pressing issues can crowd out any particular foreign 
policy topic, eliminating the possibility of “leader driven” change in 
the case of U.S.–Latin American engagement. Obama took office 
in the midst of two Asian wars, a financial meltdown, and a social 
welfare network frayed to the point of dysfunction. In the face of 
such pressing issues, reforming U.S. Latin America policy did not 
command the attention of the public or of the President and his core 
foreign policy team. Given the “realities of scarce resources” that 
tend to determine priorities on the presidential agenda, much of the 
policy inherited from Bush was merely sustained. 
Policy continuity under Obama resulted not only from a lack of 
attention paid by a president overwhelmed by more urgent matters, 
but also from pressures generated by actors who pay considerable 
attention to the ways in which the United States engages with the 
region. A substantial policy shift by Obama would have required 
not only overcoming inertia—divesting attention away from more 
pressing policy matters to reconsider and reorient the U.S. stance— 
but also overcoming these powerful influences. Obama already had 
used much of his political capital to promote a significant overhaul of 
the health care system, enact one of the biggest (albeit inadequate) 
economic stimulus packages in U.S. history, pressure for increased 
regulation of the financial sector, and to set timelines for withdrawal 
from both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. In explaining the “issue 
inertia” that often defines presidential treatment of foreign policy 
issues, Wood and Peake note that, “(A)s political creatures, presidents 
are ever aware of the risks associated with ignoring or attending to 
new policy problems.”14
2) Bureaucracy: Obama had little help from the executive 
branch in formulating a coherent policy. The State Department’s 
Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) bureau was hampered by the 
machinations of a few senators, especially Jim Demint (Rep.-South 
Carolina) and Robert Menendez (Dem.-New Jersey), who used 
their senatorial prerogatives to place “holds” on the appointments 
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of Arturo Valenzuela as Assistant Secretary of State for Western 
Hemisphere Affairs and Thomas Shannon as U.S. ambassador to 
Brazil. As a result, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was forced to 
rely ad hoc on officials outside of WHA, and in effect the policy itself 
became ad hoc. 
A number of actors resistant to a potential policy shift could also be 
found within the executive branch itself, as many of the main players 
dealing with Latin America policy in the Obama administration 
had been engaged in shaping this policy for the last decade or more, 
while the newcomers were neither bureaucratically nor intellectually 
forceful presences in Washington. In this context, “bureaucratic 
advocacy” was an unlikely source of policy change under Obama. 
To the contrary, administration bureaucrats served to promote and 
advance the dominant policy paradigm. 
One example was the continuity in both the logic and the content 
of Plan Merida, the counter-narcotics and security policy package 
put forth under the Bush administration in response to the spread 
of organized crime and impunity in Mexico and Central America. 
Despite ample evidence suggesting that the policies were exacerbating 
insecurity and undermining democratic governance, advocates in 
the counter-narcotics, intelligence and military agencies (in both 
Washington and in U.S. embassies across the region) maintained 
vigorous advocacy for the militarized policy. Another example was the 
tendency of U.S. officials to react to rather than ignore inflammatory 
rhetoric from leaders of the ALBA alliance. 
Yet another example of continuity emerged in the Central American 
isthmus, where time and again echoes of the past reverberated in 
bilateral relationships. The administration’s tepid response to the 
Honduran coup had signaled the likelihood that congressional 
rightwingers rather than potential reformists in the executive 
branch were to carry the day in instances where Central American 
elites challenged longstanding balances of power in their countries. 
Despite respectful White House acknowledgement of Mauricio 
Funes Cartagena’s election as president of El Salvador in 2009, State 
Department staff and the U.S. embassy in San Salvador tended to be 
hostile to the government because of President Funes’ political base 
in the FMLN. When the rightwing opposition party —encouraged 
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by U.S. responses to the 2009 military coup in Honduras and the 
June 2012 ouster of Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo Méndez 
—tried to take advantage of a confrontation between the Salvadoran 
Congress and the judiciary, by suggesting that the Funes government 
was threatening the survival of democracy and thus implicitly 
inviting a coup d’etat, the U.S. embassy and State Department issued 
statements that appeared to back the golpistas. They were responding 
in part to congressional pressures from Senators Menendez and 
Marco Rubio (Rep.-Florida), who have been heavily backed by the 
hard line Cuba lobby. Moreover, resistance to change went beyond 
governments of the left as was evident in the State Department’s 
aggressive rejection of Guatemala President Otto Perez Molina’s 
mere suggestion, echoed by numerous governments in the region, 
that the drug prohibition paradigm needed to be reconsidered in its 
entirety. 
Policy toward Colombia offers another example of the power of 
inertia. Assistant Secretary Valenzuela had served as principal 
National Security Adviser for Western Hemisphere Affairs in 
Clinton’s White House, at a time when the multi-year Plan Colombia 
was conceived and first implemented as a major component of U.S. 
policy in South America, eventually channeling nearly $7 billion into 
a comprehensive package of counter-insurgency and anti-narcotics 
trafficking programs. As a Senator (Dem.-Delaware), Vice President 
Joseph Biden had also played a major role in the original shaping of 
Plan Colombia, which emphasized militarization to a greater extent 
than Colombian President Andrés Pastrana Arango had proposed.15 In 
the 2000 congressional debate over funding the plan, Biden was a key 
Democratic proponent of the Clinton position, arguing vehemently 
against the amendment proposed by Senator Paul Wellstone (Dem.-
Minnesota) to decrease the military aid portion of Plan Colombia 
and commit additional resources to reducing the U.S. demand for 
drugs. Sen. Biden remarked that he based his position on a trip 
to Colombia during which he spent “2 days, 24 hours a day” with 
President Pastrana. “For the first time, the Senator said, 
we have a President who understands that his democracy is at 
stake. He is willing to risk his life-not figuratively, literally… Folks, 
if they lose, mark my words, we are going to reap the whirlwind 
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in this hemisphere on matters that go far beyond drugs. It will 
include terrorism, it will include whole cadres of issues we have 
not thought about.16
Thus, even before the 9-11 attacks, Biden articulated, and advocated, 
a framework for a U.S.-Colombian partnership focused on counter-
terrorism, as opposed to counternarcotics.
3) Domestic Politics: In the absence of executive branch initiatives, 
the U.S. Congress seized the opportunity to shape policy toward the 
region. President Obama did use executive orders to relax restrictions 
on travel and the transfer of remittances by Cuban-Americans to their 
homeland. But he stopped far short of what OAS members demanded 
—restoring Cuba’s membership in the organization and ending a 
policy of hostility— or what the major changes occurring in Cuba 
might have engendered in response. Cuba policy was dominated in 
the House by Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Florida Republican who was chair 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee from 2011 to 2013 (and was 
ranking minority member of the committee in 2009 and 2010), and 
in the Senate by Sen. Menendez, who had long been associated with 
virulent opposition to the Cuban government. Similarly in the case 
of Honduras, ultra-conservative members of the Senate —led by Sen. 
Demint as described above —diminished the credibility of President 
Obama’s proclaimed commitment to democracy. They held hostage 
the nominations of Valenzuela and Shannon, demanding that the 
President support the Honduran regime that came to power in 2009 
by ousting Manuel Zelaya, the democratically elected president, and 
ignore the murderous crackdown on dissent that followed the coup. 
With a reprise of Cold War rhetoric, conservatives endeavored to 
situate U.S.-Latin American relations within a larger policy paradigm 
that painted the encroaching power of “the left” in Latin America as 
a fundamental threat to American interests. The Colombia case once 
again is an illustrative example. The government of President Alvaro 
Uribe Vélez was cast as a key U.S. ally surrounded by hostile socialist 
leaders in Venezuela, Bolivia, and to some extent Ecuador, that the 
United States had to help defend against leftist revolutionary forces 
within its own borders. Ros-Lehtinen demanded the United States 
strengthen ties with Colombia through increased military cooperation 
because “U.S. interests throughout the hemisphere are under attack.”17
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Despite efforts by a number of concerned Democratics in Congress 
and nongovernmental organizations to call attention to the grave 
problems inherent in President Obama’s positions, and to generate 
political pressure for change, there was no U.S. voting block or 
powerful interest group that created real political consequences for 
failure to modify policy. On the other side, however, powerful political 
actors opposing any policy paradigm shift sought to link this region of 
the world to key national constituencies. 
Playing to a conservative Florida voting bloc, Reps. Ros-Lehtinen 
and Connie Mack, also a Florida Republican and a senior member 
of the House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, made outspoken 
criticism of President Hugo Chávez and other so-called Latin 
American “thugocrats” central to their political agendas. Following 
Obama’s election Mack sponsored or co-sponsored three bills related 
to Colombia. Given Florida’s status as a swing state whose substantial 
number of electoral votes has played a historic role in making or 
breaking presidential bids, these two Republicans were viewed as 
having the potential to create high political costs for any major U.S. 
Colombia policy reform.
By connecting the Colombian Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) to 
the reduction of unemployment, Republican members of Congress 
also endeavored to link U.S. Colombia policy to an issue that is 
fundamentally important to virtually all domestic constituencies, 
though the  primary domestic advocates for the agreement were 
the multinational corporations that stood to gain from its passage. 
Playing to popular opinion in the midst of an acute economic 
crisis, Republican senators and representatives used floor speeches, 
resolutions, and letters to paint the CFTA as a quick and costless way 
to create jobs in the United States and to head off potential executive 
resistance to its passage. As California Republican Representative 
Dreier stated: 
“We have got an unemployment rate in excess of 10 percent… 
and we think—Democrat and Republican alike—that it’s a very 
good idea for the President to be focusing on job creation and 
economic growth… He has a wonderful opportunity to take what 
I believe would be the strongest, boldest, most dynamic step 
towards economic growth, and that is to send to Capitol Hill 
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three pending trade agreements: Panama, Colombia and South 
Korea.”18
One might have expected the growing Latino population in the 
United States to create societal pressure for recalibrating relations 
with Latin America, but the Latino community is not united. Cuban-
Americans focus on Cuba itself or on countries they perceive are allies 
of Cuba, and they are divided internally about U.S. policy toward 
Cuba.19 Mexican-Americans, the largest segment of ethnic Latinos, 
tend not to focus on foreign policy, and concern themselves with 
domestic issues such as the economy, jobs, and access to health care 
and education, and with immigration. Even when non-Cuban Latinos 
take up foreign policy issues, the Obama Administration has tended 
to ignore them, assuming that they will not vote for Republicans.
4) External Shocks: With respect to Colombia several “shocks” might 
have derailed the policy, includingthe Colombian government’s 
systematic record of committing grave human rights violations, 
the reemergence of paramilitary groups and extensive evidence 
of continued governmental connections with paramilitaries, the 
record levels of Andean coca production at a point when U.S. 
counternarcotics support was also near its peak, obvious signs of 
the diversion of trafficking to Mexico, Central America and the 
Caribbean, and the 2009 scandal involving Colombia’s domestic 
intelligence service, the Administrative Security Department (DAS 
in the Spanish acronym).20 
Yet none of these exogenous factors constituted enough of a “shock” 
to propel major policy change, exemplifying the extent to which 
foreign policy paradigms can withstand the “reality checks” of data 
that demonstrates policy failure. Hall suggests that while “a policy 
paradigm can be threatened by the appearance of anomalies, namely 
by developments that are not fully comprehensible…within the terms 
of the paradigm,” paradigms are often “stretched” to incorporate 
such anomalies. By insisting on the effectiveness of U.S. Colombia 
policy in reaching a number of stated goals, and generally excusing 
the Colombian government’s human rights record, President Obama 
effectively deflected attention from developments that might have 
catalyzed a policy change away from the one established by the two 
previous administrations. With regard to the drug reduction goals 
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and strategies of the policy, expert reports on the “manipulation 
of data and diagnosis…in order to consolidate the ‘success of the 
strategy’” suggest that U.S. officials have endeavored to shape reality 
to fit within the policy paradigm, as opposed to vice versa.21
Policy under Obama becomes easier to understand if one conceives 
of U.S. foreign policy paradigms as resistant to change, shaped by 
entrenched “behind the scenes” actors and groups and only altered in 
the case that potential “drivers” of change, stemming from executive 
leadership, the foreign policy bureaucracy, domestic constituencies, or 
external shocks, intervene to overcome a general policy inertia. Given 
the “economy of attention” and limited political capital of the President, 
and the lack of cogency in foreign policy toward Latin America for 
much of the U.S. population, it is not surprising that Obama did not 
use his limited influence to push a change in U.S. policy toward Latin 
America, a region about which U.S. voters tend to pay little attention 
and where he would have certainly confronted significant resistance. 
Nor is it likely that the impetus for policy change would have come 
from a foreign policy bureaucracy comprised primarily of actors who, 
in previous administrations, played key roles in shaping and promoting 
the framework that has defined U.S.-Latin American relations for 
the past decade. Finally, the crucial relationship with Colombia, like 
that with Mexico engulfed in crime-related violence, exemplifies the 
extent to which U.S. foreign policy paradigms are resistant to the kinds 
of empirical “anomalies” that should challenge their validity. Rather 
than reevaluating the policy paradigm to take into account this reality, 
policymakers under Obama insisted on the success of the framework, 
to the point of negotiating the facts to fit the theory. Inertia prevailed 
over the change one could believe in.
IV.   An Emerging Asia-Pacific Policy for the Hemisphere 
Inertia in Washington does not imply an absence of change in 
U.S.-Latin American relations, because patterns of Latin American 
interaction with the United States are contingent on a number 
of factors, encompassing changes in U.S. bilateral relations with 
particular countries and the impact on the United States of the 
shifting landscape of regionalism. For example, presidential elections 
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outcomes in Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay are likely to be the most 
significant for the region and U.S. economic and security relations. 
U.S.-Mexican security cooperation under the Peña Nieto government 
is likely to change because of popular antagonism to Plan Merida.22
With regard to regional configurations, uncertainties abound. One 
concerns the fate of the Venezuela-led ALBA alliance in the aftermath 
of President Chávez’s death in March, 2013. Another has to do with 
the way relatively new regional blocs and organizations that exclude 
the United States and Canada —such as UNASUR (Union of South 
American Nations), CELAC (Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean States), and SICA (Central American Integration System) 
—relate to each other and to the OAS. 
Traditionally, the OAS had been Washington’s preferred instrument 
for hemispheric cooperation, a claim that persists in the imagination 
of ALBA countries that have chafed at OAS pressures on human 
rights-related issues. In reality, recent U.S. administrations have done 
little to buttress the OAS’s relevance and have repeatedly undermined 
the leadership of Secretary General José Miguel Insulza. The 2012 
Summit of the Americas in Cartagena at which President Obama 
was caught entirely off-guard by unified Latin American criticism 
over drug policy, Cuba and other issues, underscored the degree to 
which the OAS has simultaneously been weakened and ceased to 
serve as a tool for American hegemony. The Obama administration’s 
willingness to make policy concessions demanded by Latin American 
governments, particularly regarding the participation of Cuba, will 
determine whether there is another OAS Summit in 2015 or whether 
instead there will no longer exist an institutional venue bringing 
together the leaders of all countries in the hemisphere. Officially, the 
executive branch remains committed to the OAS, labeled in 2013 
by a State Department spokesman as “the pre-eminent multilateral 
organization, speaking for the hemisphere.”23 But resistance is to be 
expected from the Congress and bureaucracy. Notably when he was 
Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2012, Secretary 
of State John Kerry joined a bipartisan group of senators who signed 
an open letter to the State Department charging that the OAS “is 
sliding into an administrative and financial paralysis,” that could lead 
to its “irrelevance.”24
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If the United States is ambivalent toward the OAS, the organization’s 
standing is even more tenuous for the ALBA countries, Cuba and 
increasingly Brazil. It is in that context that some Latin American 
advocates of strengthening UNASUR and CELAC see these entities 
as mechanisms to  further Latin America’s autonomy from the United 
States. As Uruguay’s foreign minister, Luís Almagro Lemes, remarked 
in February 2014, “the importance of CELAC is political, in the sense 
that it enables Latin America to have a strategic dialogue with the 
EU and China apart from the relationship China or the EU has with 
the United States.”25 
Washington has been circumspect in not openly challenging 
these Latin American initiatives. But privately some officials have 
expressed reactions ranging from disappointment to contempt at 
being excluded from regional discussions. At a minimum they have 
been frustrated by the increasing lack of U.S. influence in regional 
affairs. This was evident in March 2014, for example, when regional 
leaders rebuffed Vice President Joe Biden’s attempt to organize a 
special OAS meeting to consider sanctions against Venezuela.26  
One possible U.S. reaction to its diminishing status might have been 
to recognize at long last that the time had come to end Washington’s 
hegemonic presumption. In fact, it appeared that was what Secretary 
Kerry tried to do in November 2013, in announcing at the OAS that 
“The era of the Monroe Doctrine is over.” He continued by saying,
The relationship that we seek and that we have worked hard to foster 
is not about a United States declaration about how and when it will 
intervene in the affairs of other American states. It’s about all of our 
countries viewing one another as equals, sharing responsibilities, 
cooperating on security issues, and adhering not to doctrine, but to 
the decisions that we make as partners to advance the values and the 
interests that we share.27
Remarkably, though, no major U.S. newspaper reported on the 
Secretary’s speech, and it seemed to have had no impact even in 
WHA, the State Department’s Latin American bureau. 
WHA officials did not repeat the announcement in any public 
statements, and the WHA website did not change after Kerry’s speech. 
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It still trumpeted four goals of US policy, without acknowledgement 
that these have mostly been honored in the breach: Promoting Social 
and Economic Opportunity, Clean Energy and Mitigated Effects of 
Climate Change, Safety of the Hemisphere’s Citizens, Strengthening 
Effective Institutions of Democratic Governance.28 For example, 
while most of the hemisphere has rejected the Washington Consensus 
straightjacket, because it generated unemployment and undermined 
governments’ abilities to reduce income inequality, WHA still viewed 
the promotion of Washington-style “free trade” as a way to achieve 
social and economic opportunity. While WHA proclaimed it advances 
citizen security by supporting Plan Merida, it failed to acknowledge 
that 98 percent of the crimes committed in Mexico go unpunished. 
Moreover, as we have noted, the United States did enormous damage 
to the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2009 by undermining 
OAS efforts to re-establish democracy in Honduras, rather than 
serving as strong advocate of democratic governance.
In short, the United States has not responded to the loss of influence 
by discarding its hegemonic presumption, despite Kerry’s audacious 
pronouncement. Instead, it seems intent on admonishing Latin 
America that the region needs the United States more than the 
United States needs its neighbors, much as George Kennan advised in 
1950. In a report to the Secretary of State the revered diplomat wrote:
It is important for us to keep before ourselves and the Latin 
American peoples at all times the reality of the thesis that we 
are a great power; that we are by and large much less in need of 
them than they are in need of us; that we are entirely prepared 
to leave to themselves those who evince no particular desire for 
the forms of collaboration that we have to offer; that the danger 
of a failure to exhaust the possibilities of our mutual relationship 
is always greater to them than to us; that we can afford to wait, 
patiently and good naturedly; and that we are more concerned to 
be respected than to be liked or understood.29
Indeed, Kennan’s prescription seems to be precisely the course the 
Obama Administration is following, as it fashions a policy to ignore 
much of the hemisphere and work closely with a few countries willing 
to sign on to its Asian-Pacific alliance. The apparent shift toward 
situating Latin American relations in a broader Asia-Pacific context 
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has largely been presented in domestic economic rather than political 
terms, although it represents as well a response to the twenty-fold 
increase in China’s trade with the region over the past fifteen 
years.30 It also sends an unequivocal signal that liberalizing trade 
remains the core principle guiding U.S. thinking about economic 
relations in the hemisphere, in effect continuing a paradigm that 
has reigned for decades. The lynchpin of this shift is the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), also known as the Trans-Pacific Strategic 
Economic Partnership, a multilateral free trade agreement aimed at 
reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers to boost trade and investment. 
Originally formed by Chile, Brunei, New Zealand and Singapore in 
2006, today five more countries are negotiating membership in the 
group: Australia, Malaysia, Peru, the United States and Vietnam, and 
other countries, including Mexico, Colombia, Canada and Japan are 
considering doing so. Speaking at a 2013 conference at the Inter-
American Development Bank, U.S. Commerce Under Secretary for 
International Trade Francisco Sánchez referred to “the framework 
for the TPP agreement as ‘a landmark accomplishment’ because 
it contains all the elements considered desirable for modern trade 
agreements: It removes all tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade; takes 
a regional approach to promote development of production and 
supply chains; and eases regulatory red tape limiting cross border 
flows.”31 
The degree to which the TPP has become central to policy-makers’ 
vision for U.S. ties with the region is evident in increasingly frequent 
official statements. Briefing reporters after President Obama’s May 
2013 visit to Mexico and Costa Rica, National Security Adviser for 
Latin America Ricardo Zuniga noted “the strategic relationship 
between the United States and Mexico, and that stems in part from 
the $1.5 billion in commerce between the United States and Mexico 
every day, and the half-a-trillion-dollar economy that exists with 
us ...  as well as our work together in global institutions and global 
mechanisms such as the G-20 and our ... joint participation in the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership.”32 But despite continued administration 
pressure, Senate Democrats effectively denied “fast track” trade 
authority to President Obama in February 2014, denying him the 
opportunity to make the TPP a component of his Asian pivot.33
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The tilt toward Asia-Pacific as a magnet for U.S.-Latin American 
ties was not limited to the trade-focused TPP. The growing 
emphasis placed on strengthening U.S. ties to the Pacific Alliance 
—comprised of Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru— suggested 
that Washington aims to advance a broader, alternative regional 
agenda. This was evident in the Quadrenniel Defense Review 
(QDR), the major strategic planning document for the U.S. military. 
Released on March 4, 2014, it emphasized that the primary U.S. 
security interest is “inextricably linked to the peace and security 
of the Asia-Pacific region.” The role, it asserted, for those Western 
Hemispheric militaries “that want to partner with the United States 
and demonstrate a commitment to investing the time and resources 
required to develop and sustain an effective, civilian-led enterprise” 
is essentially to increase “interoperability with the United States 
and other likeminded partners,” that is to play a subordinate role in 
supporting the U.S.-led Asian-Pacific alliance.34 
On the basis of this analysis of trends in the region and constraints 
on policy innovation in the United States, we anticipate that the 
Hemisphere will gradually bifurcate in one of two ways: (1) between 
a Northern tier of Latin American countries subordinate to and 
frequently resentful of the United States, and a Southern tier that 
essentially opts to ignore Washington; or (2) between four key 
countries that border the Pacific Ocean (Chile, Peru, Colombia, and 
Mexico) striving to participate in the new Pacific Alliance jointly 
with the United States, and the other major countries in the region 
that seek common cause through institutions such as UNASUR or 
CELAC.
There arguably is, then, a new regional agenda in Washington. 
Developed alongside an enduring preoccupation with security from 
the Andean countries northward through Central America and 
Mexico, this vision revives the trade-focused approach that shaped 
U.S. preferences toward Latin America in the late Cold War and 
early post-Cold War eras, and that had fallen by the wayside over 
the past decade following its rejection by a heterogeneous majority 
of South American countries. The difference is that now, rather than 
try to convince its Southern neighbors of the desirability of a U.S.-
led hemisphere-wide bloc, Washington has chosen to incorporate 
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like-minded Latin American countries into its trade-focused agenda 
centered on Asia and the Pacific.
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AbstrAct 
Washington’s Asia-Pacific Response to a  
Changing Hemispheric Order
This article analyzes the principal factors that are shaping U.S. 
policies toward Hemispheric affairs in the 21st century, situating these 
historically in the context of U.S.-Latin American relations. It draws on 
approaches to the study of foreign policy making processes to examine 
explanations for why the United States has been unable to respond 
to significant changes in the region as the kind of “partner” promised 
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by President Barack Obama in 2009. It then highlights how the U.S. 
response has been an attempt to siphon away some countries into a 
new Asia-Pacific alliance consistent with the U.S. “pivot” to Asia. 
resumen 
El vuelco hacia Asia-Pacífico de Washington  
en respuesta a un Orden Hemisférico cambiante 
Este artículo analiza los principales factores que están moldeando las 
políticas de Estados Unidos hacia los asuntos hemisféricos en el siglo 
XXI, ubicándolas históricamente en el contexto de las relaciones entre 
Estados Unidos y América Latina. Plantea abordajes al estudio de los 
procesos de formulación de políticas exteriores para analizar por qué 
Estados Unidos no ha podido responder ante cambios significativos 
en la región como el "socio" que el Presidente Barack Obama había 
prometido en 2009. Luego el artículo destaca cómo la respuesta de 
Estados Unidos ha representado un intento por arrastrar algunos países 
hacia una nueva alianza Asia-Pacífico, hecho que guarda coherencia 
con el viraje de Estados Unidos hacia Asia.
summArio 
A guinada de Washington para a Ásia-Pacífico  
em resposta a uma ordem hemisférica em transformação
Este artigo analisa os principais fatores que estão moldando as políticas 
dos Estados Unidos voltadas aos assuntos hemisféricos no século 21, 
situando-as historicamente no contexto das relações entre os Estados 
Unidos e a América Latina. Lança abordagens ao estudo dos processos 
de formulação de políticas exteriores para analisar por que os Estados 
Unidos não puderam responder às mudanças significativas na região 
como o "sócio" que o Presidente Barack Obama havia prometido em 
2009. Em seguida, o artigo destaca como a resposta dos Estados Unidos 
representou uma tentativa de arrastar alguns países para uma nova 
aliança Ásia-Pacífico, fato que guarda coerência com a guinada dos 
Estados Unidos para a Ásia.
